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This paper analyses the Marxian theory of exploitation. A gen-
eral axiomatic approach is developed which is appropriate to study
the concept of exploitation - what it is and how it should be captured
empirically. Two properties are presented that capture some funda-
mental Marxian insights. It is shown that, contrary to the received
view, there exists a nonempty class of definitions of exploitation that
preserve the relation between exploitation and profits - called Profit-
Exploitation Correspondence Principle - in general economies with
heterogeneous agents, complex class structures, and production tech-
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1 Introduction
After a wave of intense research and debates in the 1970s and 1980s, the
Marxian theory of exploitation has moved to the sidelines of academic eco-
nomics. The notion of exploitation has never had much appeal for main-
stream economists. But heterodox scholars, in the main, also seem sceptical
about the possibility of developing a logically coherent and empirically mean-
ingful concept of exploitation. Two broad (and related) sets of objections
have been moved against the Marxian theory of exploitation.
First, it is unclear what Marxian exploitation actually is. At a general
level, it can be defined as the (forced) extraction of surplus labour, or as
a power relation leading to systematic differences between the labour con-
tributed (in some relevant sense) by workers in productive activities and the
labour that they receive (in some relevant sense) in return. As intuitive as
these general formulations are, outside of very stylised two-class economies
with linear technologies and one type of homogeneous labour, the notions of
surplus labour, or of the labour contributed and received by workers have no
obvious interpretation. Different definitions of exploitation can be, and have
in fact been proposed that rely on different interpretations of these concepts
(see, for example, Okishio [27]; Morishima [25]; Roemer [31]; Flaschel [6, 7];
Duménil [3]; Foley [10]). Actually, as Steedman [37] famously argued, it is
not even clear that these concepts - and, a fortiori, Marxian exploitation -
can be coherently defined due to the conceptual problems inherent in the
notion of labour embodied.
Second, it is unclear what the concept of exploitation does. The con-
ceptual problems, anomalies and counterexamples identified in the literature
have led to increasingly complex and often counterfactual definitions that
have progressively lost intuitive appeal, and also their applicability to ac-
tual capitalist economies, calling into question the usefulness of the notion
of exploitation. At a methodological level, this is often attributed to the
mathematical turn taken by the debate on exploitation in the 1970s, which,
according to critics, has shifted the focus from the broader conceptual issues
to relatively minor technical details.
This paper defends the relevance of Marxian exploitation while adopting
a formal approach to exploitation theory. First, a definition is proposed,
which is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil [3]; Foley
[10]; Duménil, Foley, and Lévy [4]; see also Mohun [23]). According to this
definition, an agent is exploited (resp., an exploiter) if and only if the labour
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she contributes is greater (resp., lower) than the share of aggregate social
labour that she receives via her income. This approach defines exploitation
as a feature of the competitive allocation of social labour rather than as the
result of productive inefficiencies, or labour market imperfections. Unlike the
received definitions, it has a clear empirical content, for it is firmly anchored
to the actual data of the economy. Further, we show that it preserves several
widely shared positive and normative intuitions concerning the notion of
exploitation, including the existence of a robust relation between exploitation
and profits. This is an important and surprising result.
At a general, theoretical level, it is often argued that the concept of ex-
ploitation is central in Marxian economics because it links the visible, epiphe-
nomenal characteristics of capitalist economies (as revealed by monetary vari-
ables) with deeper, structural forces and mechanisms. Whether profits are
indissolubly linked to exploitation is important, in this perspective, both if
exploitation is meant to uncover the fundamental forces underlying the dy-
namics of accumulation in capitalist economies; and if it is an essentially
normative criterion to evaluate, and indict, capitalism. For, given private
ownership of productive assets, one should expect profits to be a counterpart
of the transfer of social surplus and social labour from workers to capitalists,
and one of the causes of inequalities in well-being freedom.
The existence of a relation between exploitation and profits has been fa-
mously proved by Okishio [28] in linear economies with homogeneous labour.
Given its relevance the result has been dubbed the Fundamental Marx-
ian Theorem (henceforth, FMT), and has sparked a substantial literature.1
Whereas the result was successfully extended to Leontief economies with het-
erogeneous labour (see, e.g., Fujimori [12]; Krause [14]; Bowles and Gintis
[1]), Steedman [37] proved that the FMT does not hold in von Neumann
economies with joint production. Morishima [25] and Roemer [31] proposed
two alternative definitions of exploitation that meet Steedman’s critique.
Nonetheless, these results are far from conclusive: Yoshihara and Veneziani
[46] have shown that neither Morishima’s [25] nor Roemer’s [31] definition
preserves the FMT in economies with a convex technology and homogeneous
labour. Further, the robustness of the FMT in more general economies with
heterogeneous skills and labour inputs is an open question.
1The literature is too vast for a comprehensive list of references. In addition to the
classic contributions cited in the text, it is worth mentioning the more recent detailed
discussions by Fleurbaey [9]; Mohun [22]; Flaschel [7]; Yoshihara and Veneziani [46].
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As explained in section 4 below, our analysis bears only a broad concep-
tual relation with the FMT literature. Yet, in the light of the debates on
the FMT, it is remarkable that, if the New Interpretation is adopted, then it
is possible to establish a robust relation between exploitation and profits in
general economic environments with heterogeneous labour. Indeed, the New
Interpretation is the only definition - among the main ones in the literature
- with this property.2
The second contribution of the paper is methodological. A general ax-
iomatic approach is developed, whereby the desirable characteristics of a
definition of exploitation are stated using the language of formal logic. As
this is one of the first applications of axiomatic analysis to Marxian and clas-
sical economics,3 the next subsection addresses some methodological issues
related to the use of mathematics in economics, placing our approach in the
context of recent debates. The aim is not to provide a general methodologi-
cal discussion, but rather to explain why the axiomatic approach adopted in
this paper is both appropriate and insightful in the analysis of the concept
of exploitation. The uninterested reader may safely skip to section 2.
1.1 Taking the axiomatic road
This paper addresses the issue of the appropriate definition of exploitation
and measure of exploitative relations in capitalist economies. The motivation
of our analysis is not the lack, but the wealth of plausible candidates: as noted
above, many different definitions can be, and have in fact been proposed,
which incorporate different positive and normative intuitions.
The fundamental question is how to choose among all of the existing and
the conceivable definitions. Thus far, the debate has largely been reactive:
new definitions have often emerged as the product of a process of adjustment
of the theory to various anomalies and counterexamples identified in the lit-
erature. We adopt a different approach. Rather than proposing another
definition, and comparing it with the existing alternatives, we develop a gen-
eral axiomatic framework to analyse what exploitation is, and how it should
be measured. The axiomatic method is used to rigorously and explicitly state
2This paper significantly generalises Veneziani and Yoshihara [41], which focuses on a
smaller set of economies with homogeneous labour inputs and on a specific equilibrium
notion.
3Notable exceptions include Yoshihara [44], Veneziani and Yoshihara [41], and Flaschel
et al. [8].
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the normative and positive foundations of the notion of exploitation.
The starting point of our analysis is the acknowledgment that the con-
cept of exploitation has a quantitative dimension. This is not to say that
exploitation can or should be reduced to a quantitative phenomenon. Purely
distributive approaches that reduce exploitation to an inequality in produc-
tive assets (such as Roemer’s [31] seminal property relations approach), for
example, are ultimately unsatisfactory. For exploitative social relations ar-
guably involve some form of power, force, or coercion, which need not be
clearly measurable.4
Yet the concept of exploitation also has an inherently quantitative dimen-
sion, such that it is meaningful in principle to say that “advanced economies
have become significantly more exploitative over the past four decades”, or
that “exploitation is worse in country A than in country B”. Exploitation
diagnoses the process through which “certain inequalities in incomes are gen-
erated by inequalities in rights and powers over productive resources: the
inequalities occur, in part at least, through the ways in which the exploiters,
by virtue of their exclusionary rights and powers over resources, are able to
appropriate labour effort of the exploited” (Wright [43], p.1563). The analyt-
ical focus of this paper is precisely the quantitative dimension of exploitation
and the most appropriate way of capturing this aspect of exploitative social
relations.
It may be objected that the possibility of measuring a certain phenom-
enon does not imply that formal tools should be used to study it.5 Critical
realism, for example, has long argued against the mainstream insistence that
mathematics or the logical deductivist method be used always and every-
where in economics (Lawson [16]). According to critical realists, social reality
is most plausibly construed as an open, structured, dynamic and internally
related system and mathematical-deductivist methods are inappropriate in
the causal-explanatory analysis of open systems (Lawson [16, 18]).
A thorough discussion of the role of formal tools in social theorising goes
beyond the scope of this paper. But it is worth explaining why the main
objections against the use of mathematics in economics do not apply here,
and the axiomatic method is both appropriate and insightful for our analysis.
4A critical discussion of Roemer’s approach, and of the role of power in exploitation
theory is in Veneziani [39, 40]. See also the insightful analysis in Skillman [35] and Vrousalis
[42].
5Conversely, the fact that some variables are not measurable does not rule out a priori
the use of formal tools and concepts (Katzner [13]).
5
This paper examines the category of “exploitation”, in order to under-
stand what it means, and how it can be captured empirically. Our theoretical
effort can be conceived of as philosophical underlabouring a central concept
of Marxian economics and we use the axiomatic method in order to identify
the desirable properties of a definition (and measure) of exploitation. The
analysis is not based on any assumptions - whether explicit or implicit - about
the nature of social reality as a closed system, and about the pervasiveness
of strict regularities and constant conjunctions of events.
Ours is an investigation in scientific ontology and in this respect it is
similar in nature to Sen’s [33] analysis of the concepts of functionings and
capabilities (see Martins [19]).6 Our axiomatic framework does not incor-
porate any hypotheses concerning causal laws (or even tendencies) within a
predictionist perspective (Lawson [16], p.60). Rather, it aims to clarify the
social category of exploitation and to capture exploitative relations a poste-
riori, focusing on the state of the economy at a given point in time. It is
therefore conceptually analogous to the approach used to identify appropri-
ate measures of poverty or inequality (e.g., Foster [11]), labour productivity
(Flaschel et al [8]), or labour content (Yoshihara and Veneziani [48]).
The axioms are thus abstract in that they incorporate relevant philosoph-
ical views about the nature and the positive and normative foundations of
Marxian exploitation, and about the properties of an appropriate definition
of (one aspect of) exploitative social relations. But they are also empirically
oriented, in that they focus on observable, well-defined magnitudes, and do
not rely on “claims that are believed to be false of our world, and of any
really possible counterfactual world” (Lawson [17], p.766).
The axiomatic framework also precisely identifies the domain and scope of
the analysis by focusing on a set of economic agents and on a class of economic
environments and allocations. But this by no means entails a reductionist
perspective. On the one hand, no strong a priori restrictions are imposed
on agent behaviour or on the institutional mechanisms (market-based or
otherwise) regulating economic interactions. The axioms incorporate no as-
sumptions concerning individuals’ ontology (including their selfish or ethical
motivations, the origin of their preferences, or the notion of individual ra-
tionality), the nature of social interactions, and so on. On the other hand,
6Interestingly, this is not the only similarity with Sen’s theory: at the substantive
level, the definition of exploitation that emerges from our analysis is conceptually related
to Sen’s theory of well-being freedom. For a discussion see Veneziani and Yoshihara [41].
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although the axioms focus on the exploitation status of individual agents at a
given point in time, they do not entail a commitment to atomism, to a static
view of social reality, or to the existence of a fixed, given unit of analysis.
The axiomatic system can be modified to incorporate aggregate, dynamic,
or relational properties, depending on the object of analysis.
To be sure, the intuitive appeal of a definition is fundamental, and a cer-
tain definition should provide the right answers in situations in which we feel
that intuition is a reliable guide. The axiomatic method is not “a substitute
for intuition ... but instead ... a way of articulating [the intuitions that hold
in specific situations] into operationally useful conditions pertaining to an
entire class of cases” (Thomson [38], p.356). Indeed, as shown by the often
surprising impossibility results obtained in social choice theory, or by the very
difficulty in providing a definition of exploitation that preserves key Marxian
insights, intuition alone can be insufficient. When delineating the properties
of the appropriate definition of exploitation, “Informal insights, important as
they are, cannot replace the formal investigations that are needed to exam-
ine the congruity and cogency of combinations of values and of apparently
plausible demands” (Sen [34], p.353).
Of course, the axiomatic method does not necessarily lead to univocal
conclusions: one can reject any of the axioms below, and propose a new one,
possibly leading to an alternative definition of exploitation. This indeter-
minacy is not a property of axiomatic analysis per se: it is inherent in all
social theorising and it simply reflects different positive and normative in-
tuitions.7 If anything, the axiomatic method has the advantage of making
such intuitions explicit, thus forcefully directing research and debate to the
foundational issues concerning the nature and measurement of exploitation.
This is an important point. Unlike in much of the mainstream, in this
paper the axiomatic method is not used in a purely instrumental way, for
example in order to generate predictions that match empirical data, and re-
gardless of the actual relevance of the axioms (Lawson [16, 18]). The content
of the axioms is central to our analysis, and the relevance and meaningful-
ness of the conclusions ultimately depends on it.8 As noted by Foster, in his
7As Sen ([32], p.187) noted in his insightful discussion of the labour theory of value,
“since several motivations underlying the labour theory of value can be distinguished, it is
not really surprising that different conventions for calculating aggregate labour magnitudes
would exist and also appear natural in different contexts. The source of these ambiguities
. . . [rests] in the basic multiplicity of motivation underlying the labour theory.”
8In this respect, the axiomatic approach adopted in this paper is fundamentally differ-
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thoughtful discussion of inequality and poverty measures, “The relevance of
an axiomatic result depends entirely on the acceptability or usefulness of its
constituent properties” (Foster [11], p.367).
2 Economic states
The aim is to analyse exploitation without imposing any significant restric-
tions on agents’ behaviour, market structure, and so on. Therefore we keep
the description of the economic environment to a bare minimum. Consider
an economy with N agents, n commodities, and T types of labour. Let N
be the set of agents with generic element ν and let T be the set of types of
labour with generic element τ .
Technology is described by a production set P with elements - activities -
of the form α = (−αl,−α,α) where αl ≡ (αlτ)τ∈T ∈ RT+ is a profile of labour
inputs used in production and measured in hours; α ∈ Rn+ are the inputs
of the produced goods; and α ∈ Rn+ are the outputs of the n goods.9 By
measuring labour inputs in terms of time, this description of the technology
includes standard economies as a special case.10
The net output vector arising from α is denoted as bα ≡ α − α and the
set of efficient activities in P is denoted as ∂P .11 In the rest of the paper,
we assume that: the technology displays constant returns to scale; firms
can decide not to activate any process; and the production of any output
requires some labour and some capital.12 These restrictions are rather mild
and standard in heterodox (and even mainstream) approaches.
Each agent ν ∈ N is endowed with a (possibly zero) vector of productive
assets, ων ∈ Rn+ , and a nonempty set of types of labour T ν ⊆ T that can
ent, for example, from Gérard Debreu’s classic Theory of value.
9In principle, all variables should be dated. However, because we analyse exploitative
relations in a given economy at a given point in time, we drop the time subscript for
notational convenience.
10Consider, for example, a production technology with homogeneous labour inputs but
heterogeneous skills among agents. The set T of types of labour can be interpreted as the
qualitatively homogeneous but quantitatively different labour skills. Then this technology
can be represented by a set P ⊆ RT− × Rn− × Rn+ with T = N types of heterogeneous
labour, where each component of αl ∈ RN+ is measured in the time unit, thus incorporating
skills in the description of the technology.
11Formally: ∂P ≡ {α ∈ P | @α0 ∈ P such that α0i > αi for all i}.
12These assumptions on P are stated formally in appendix A.1.
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be used in production. The total amount of time that can be used either
productively (possibly in different types of labour) or in leisure activities,
is normalised to one. Let C ⊆ Rn+ × [0, 1]T be the set of all conceivable
choices of each agent with generic element (cν ,λν ), where cν ∈ Rn+ is ν’s
consumption vector and λν = (λν1 , ...,λνT ) describes the amount of time of
each type of labour spent by ν in productive activities, where λντ ∈ [0, 1] for
all τ ∈ T ν , λντ = 0 for all τ ∈ T \T ν, andPτ∈T ν λντ 5 1.
Let (p,w) be the 1× (n+ T ) vector describing the (positive) prices of the
n commodities and the (nonnegative) wages of the T types of labour. Let
πmax = maxα∈P pα−wαlpα be the maximum profit rate that can be obtained at
prices (p, w), and let P π(p, w) be the set of production processes that yield
the maximum profit rate at (p,w).13
Our analysis does not depend on any specific assumptions on individual
households’ or firms’ behaviour, or on the institutional framework in which
agents interact. However, both the key axioms and the main results apply
only to a class of economic scenarios which may, or may not, turn out to be
true ex post. Yet they are sufficiently general and theoretically relevant to
warrant investigation and to cover a large set of possible cases.
Let 0 be the null vector. An economic environment is a set of agents, N ;
a production set, P ; a consumption space, C; a profile of agents’ sets of types
of labour, (T ν)ν∈N ; and a profile of agents’ endowments of productive assets,
(ων )ν∈N . Given an economic environment, an economic outcome is a price
vector, (p, w), a profile of consumption and labour decisions (cν ,λν )ν∈N , and
a profile of production activities operated by agents (αν )ν∈N , with aggregate
production activity, αp,w = Pν∈N αν , such that:14 (i) bαp,w = Pν∈N cν ; (ii)
pbαp,w − wαp,wl = 0; (iii) αp,w ∈ P π(p, w) with αp,wl = Pν∈N λν ; and (iv)
pcν = πmaxpαν +wλν for all ν ∈ N . A pair of an economic environment and
an economic outcome is an economic state (henceforth, ES).
The concept of ES is very general, with no substantive restrictions on
behaviour, technology or institutions. Conditions (i) and (ii) are hardly de-
manding: they simply state that aggregate net output can at least provide for
consumption, and that aggregate profits are nonnegative, respectively. Con-
dition (iii) is only slightly more restrictive in that it postulates that produc-
ers activate profit-rate-maximising processes. This is consistent with Marx’s
13Formally, Pπ (p,w) =
n
α ∈ P | πmax = pα−wαlpα
o
.
14For all vectors x, y ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i = 1, . . . , n); x ≥ y if and only
if x = y and x 6= y; x > y if and only if xi > yi (i = 1, . . . , n).
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([21], ch.10) analysis of capitalist behaviour and is common in heterodox ap-
proaches (including Sraffian price theory). It is also theoretically justified
because it is desirable to obtain a definition of exploitation that can capture
exploitative social relations under optimal capitalist behaviour. In Marxian
theory, exploitation is the product of capitalist social relations, rather than
mistakes, technical inefficiencies, or market imperfections.15 Condition (iv)
postulates that individual expenditure is subject to the budget constraint.
This yields no significant loss of generality and it does not rule out savings, as
the bundle cν is not necessarily restricted to consumption goods and services.
Further, it is theoretically justified because in Marxian theory, exploitation
is primarily the product of capitalist social relations, and in particular of the
wage relation, rather than credit markets or individual life-cycle decisions.
The notion of ES does not incorporate any of the standard features
of mainstream models such as utility functions, selfish optimising (or even
boundedly rational) consumers, and differentiable production functions. The
production set is sufficiently general to allow for the existence of a differen-
tiable production function, but it does not postulate it and nothing depends
on neoclassical assumptions of any sort. Nor does the definition of ES rely on
the concept of equilibrium. According to Lawson [18], a focus on equilibrium
is a requirement of mathematical models proceeding in deductive mode to
specify causal influences. But our inquiry is of a different, ontological nature
and so we do not need any notion of equilibrium or closure.
Perhaps more importantly, the concept of ES is not a description of the
functioning of the economy: how it is structured, what agents do or how they
choose, and so on. Rather, it acts formally as a domain condition: it defines
the scope and boundaries of the analysis. Social scientific theorising is always
context-specific, and the definition of ES makes the context explicit. It is
important to note, however, that such boundaries are rather wide indeed (and
significantly wider than in the literature), for conditions (i)-(iv) can obtain
in a range of economies and under many different assumptions concerning,
e.g., institutions and behaviour.16 Further, although it is an open question
whether our conclusions hold even more generally, the key insights of the
15Note that the condition αp,wl =
P
ν∈N λν does not imply any form of labour market
equilibrium or optimising behaviour. It simply states that the labour used in production
is performed by the agents in the economy.
16The set of economic states is nonempty. It contains, for example, generalisations of
Roemer’s [30, 31] economies as special cases (see the Addendum).
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paper are robust to several changes in the definition of ES.17
3 Defining Marxian exploitation
In Marxian theory, exploitation can be seen in two related but slightly dif-
ferent ways. One can focus on the difference between the labour performed
by workers and the labour socially necessary to produce the goods they con-
sume. Or, one can conceptualise exploitative social relations as characterised
by systematic differences between the labour that agents ‘contribute’ to the
economy and the labour they ‘receive’. As soon as one moves away from the
simplest linear economies, none of these concepts is clearly defined and, as
already noted, various definitions have been proposed which reflect different
views concerning the concept of exploitation.
Most (though not all) of the previous debates have revolved around the
appropriate definition of socially necessary labour time, or of the labour re-
ceived by agents. In order to focus on this issue, contributors have analysed
economies with homogeneous labour, in which the labour performed by work-
ers, or the labour that they contribute to the economy is uncontroversial: it
corresponds to the labour time spent in productive activities. In more general
economies, however, these concepts are not trivial.
In this section, we extend some of the main definitions to economies with
heterogeneous labour. The key step is to acknowledge that although the no-
tion of labour performed, or contributed to the economy is theoretically im-
portant, the differences between alternative approaches lie elsewhere. There-
fore we adopt a common definition of the labour performed, or contributed
by agents, measured by the value of the labour time spent in production.
This approach is consistent with the classical economists’ view on how
to convert different types of labour into a single unit, whereby “the different
kinds of labour are to be aggregated via the (gold) money wage rates” (Kurz
and Salvadori [15], p.324). According to Smith, for example,
“It is often difficult to ascertain the proportion between two
different quantities of labour. The time spent in two different
17For example, all of our results continue to hold if condition (iv) is weakened to require
that expenditure does not exceed income, and condition (i) is weakened to require that
aggregate net output is at least as high as the consumption of any individual agent (bαp,w =
cν for each ν ∈ N ), or, indeed, that aggregate net output be strictly positive.
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sorts of work will not always alone determine this proportion.
The different degrees of hardship endured, and of ingenuity exer-
cised, must likewise be taken into account. There may be more
labour in an hour’s hard work, than in two hours easy business;
or in an hour’s application to a trade which it cost ten years
labour to learn, than in a month’s industry, at an ordinary and
obvious employment. But it is not easy to find any accurate
measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In exchanging, indeed,
the different productions of different sorts of labour for one an-
other, some allowance is commonly made for both. It is adjusted,
however, not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and
bargaining of the market, according to that sort of rough equality
which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business
of common life” (Smith [36], ch.V, pp.34-35).
One can similarly interpret Ricardo’s ([29], ch.I, section II, p.11) argu-
ments that “The estimation in which different quantities of labour are held,
comes soon to be adjusted in the market with sufficient precision for all prac-
tical purposes, and depend much on the comparative skill of the labourer,
and intensity of the labour performed”. Despite some debates on the con-
cept of “abstract labour”, our approach is also consistent with Marx’s ([20],
pp.51-2) views on the conversion of complex labour into simple labour.
Indeed, although exploitation theorists often do not provide a complete
extension of their definitions to economies with heterogeneous labour, in the
main they do endorse (albeit sometimes implicitly) the classical economists’
view on the use of wages for the reduction of different types of labour to a
single unit (see, e.g., Morishima [24], ch.14; Duménil et al. [4]).18 ,19
Consider first Morishima’s [24, 25] classic definition. For any ES and
any bundle c ∈ Rn+ , let l.v. (c;w) denote the minimum amount of labour
necessary to produce c as net output.20 According to Morishima, the amount
of labour received by agent ν, who consumes cν , is l.v. (cν;w). Therefore:
Definition 1: Consider any ES. Agent ν ∈ N , who supplies λν and con-
sumes cν , is exploited if and only if wλν > l.v. (cν ;w) and an exploiter if and
18It is also worth noting that Yoshihara and Veneziani [48] have proved that in economies
with heterogeneous labour the wage-additive measure is the unique measure of labour
content that satisfies a small set of theoretically robust and intuitive axioms.
19For a different approach see Okishio [26, 28]; Fujimori [12]; Krause [14].
20Formally: l.v. (c;w) ≡ min {wαl | α ∈ P & bα = c}.
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only if wλν < l.v. (cν ;w).
Definition 1 has some desirable characteristics, according to Morishima
([25], pp.616-618): the notion of exploitation is well-defined because l.v. (c;w)
is unique, well-defined and nonnegative.21 Furthermore, although wages are
necessary to convert different types of labour into a single unit, exploitation
status can be determined prior to and independent of the prices of commodi-
ties, as in classical Marxian theory.
According to Roemer [30, 31], however, Definition 1 is conceptually flawed
because it identifies exploitation status based on production techniques that
may never be used by profit-maximising capitalists, and because the labour
received by agents should be defined incorporating information about the
prices of produced commodities, also. Like Morishima [25], Roemer [31]
focuses on the bundle cν actually consumed by agents but argues that its
labour content, denoted as l.v. (cν ; p,w), is given by the minimum amount
of labour necessary to produce it as net output using profit-rate-maximising
production processes,22 for only the latter are activated by capitalists. Then,
according to Roemer, exploitation status is determined as follows:
Definition 2: Consider any ES. Agent ν ∈ N , who supplies λν and con-
sumes cν , is exploited if and only if wλν > l.v. (cν ; p,w) and an exploiter if
and only if wλν < l.v. (cν ; p,w).
Although they preserve some important Marxian insights, Definitions 1
and 2 have been criticised because exploitation status depends on counterfac-
tual amounts of labour content (see, e.g., Flaschel [6, 7]). For the production
activities yielding l.v. (cν ;w) or l.v. (cν ; p,w) may be different from those ac-
tually used in the economy. According to critics, this use of counterfactuals
is theoretically undesirable and makes exploitation an empirically vacuous
notion, since the computation of l.v. (cν ;w) and l.v. (cν ; p, w) requires infor-
mation that is normally unavailable, including, in Morishima’s own words,
“information about all the available techniques of production, actually cho-
sen or potentially usable” ([25], p.617, italics added).23
An alternative approach has been recently proposed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani ([45, 44, 41]). Consider any ES. For any c ∈ Rn+ such that
21This follows from assumptionsA0∼A2 in Appendix A.1 (see Roemer [30], Proposition
2.1). The same holds for l.v. (c; p,w) below.
22Formally: for any c ∈ Rn+, l.v. (c; p,w) ≡ min {wαl | α ∈ Pπ (p,w) & bα = c}.
23See Yoshihara and Veneziani [46] for a detailed discussion.
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pc 5 pbαp,w, the labour content of c is defined as l.v. (c; p, w,αp,w) ≡ τ cwαp,wl ,
where τ c ∈ [0, 1] is such that τ cpbαp,w = pc.24 Thus, the labour content
of aggregate net output, bαp,w, is equal to the value of total social labour,
αp,wl , and the labour contained in any bundle c (whose value does not exceed
national income) is equal to the fraction τ c of social labour necessary to
produce a fraction of aggregate net output, τ cbαp,w, that has the same value
as c. Then:
Definition 3: Consider any ES. Agent ν ∈ N , who supplies λν and con-
sumes cν is exploited if and only if wλν > l.v. (cν ; p,w,αp,w) and an exploiter
if and only if wλν < l.v. (cν ; p,w,αp,w).
Definition 3 is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’ of Duménil
[3] and Foley [10]. In fact, for any agent ν ∈ N , τ cν represents ν’s share of
national income, and so τ cνwαp,wl is the share of (the value of) social labour
that ν receives by earning the income exactly necessary to buy cν . As in
Roemer’s [31] approach (and unlike in Morishima’s), exploitation status can
be identified only if goods’ prices are known, but social relations play a more
central role, because the definition of exploitation requires knowledge of the
social reproduction point, and it is related to the production and distribu-
tion of national income and social labour. Indeed, unlike Definitions 1 and
2, Definition 3 depends exclusively on empirically observable magnitudes.
Nonetheless, the New Interpretation has been criticised because, unlike De-
finitions 1 and 2, the agents’ actual consumption choices are only indirectly
relevant to determine exploitation status, and unlike Definition 1, exploita-
tion status depends on information about commodity prices.
This brief (and admittedly partial) survey shows that there are many pos-
sible approaches - incorporating different positive and normative intuitions
- to explain what exploitation is and how it should be captured. The ques-
tion then is how to adjudicate between them. Some preliminary answers are
provided in the next section.
4 Axiomatising Marxian exploitation
In this section, we discuss two axioms incorporating some key properties
that a definition of exploitation, and measure of exploitative relations, should
24If pbαp,w = 0, we set τ c = 0 by definition.
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satisfy and analyse their implications.
To be specific, for any ES, let W+ ≡ {ν ∈ N | ων = 0 & wλν > 0}: W+
is the set of agents with no initial endowments who supply some (productive)
labour at a given ES. Our axiomatic analysis focuses on the exploitation
status of the agents inW+. Theoretically, the setW+ is of focal interest from
a Marxian perspective even in societies with a complex class structure: if any
agents are exploited, propertyless agents who supply wage labour should be
among them. Formally, as argued below, focusing on a strict subset of the
set of agents makes the axiomatic restrictions weak and undemanding.
The first axiom is a domain condition capturing some minimal intuitions
that represent the core of Marxian exploitation theory and that are shared
by all of the main approaches.
Labour Exploitation with Heterogeneous Labour (LEH): Consider
any ES. Given any definition of exploitation, the set of exploited agents
N ted ⊆ N has the following property. There exists a profile (c1e, ..., c|W+|e )
such that, for any ν ∈ W+, cνe ∈ Rn+ , pcνe = wλν , and for some αcνe ∈ ∂P
with bαcνe = cνe and bαcνe ≯ cνe :
ν ∈ N ted if and only if wαcνel < wλν .
In order to interpret LEH, recall that the exploitation status of agent ν
is determined by the difference between the amount of labour that ν ‘con-
tributes’ to the economy, and the amount she ‘receives’. As argued in section
3, in the main approaches consistent with the classical economists’ view, the
former quantity is given by the value of the labour supplied by ν, wλν . But
there are many possible views concerning the latter quantity. As a domain
condition, LEH provides some minimal, key restrictions on the definition of
the amount of labour that a theoretically relevant subset of agents receives.25
To be specific, LEH requires that the exploitation status of each prop-
ertyless worker ν ∈ W+ be determined by identifying a nonnegative vector
cνe - call it an exploitation reference bundle (hereafter, ERB) - whose labour
content - the amount of labour that ν receives - is the labour necessary to
produce the ERB efficiently as net output, valued at current wages, wαcνel . If
25LEH only applies to labour-based definitions of exploitation. It is not relevant, for
example, for Roemer’s [31] property-relations definition or for entitlement-based theories
(Ferguson [5]). Related axioms are analysed in Yoshihara and Veneziani [45], Yoshihara
[44] and Veneziani and Yoshihara [41].
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ν supplies wλν , and wλν is more than wαcνel , then ν is regarded as contribut-
ing more labour than ν receives. According to LEH, all such agents should
be considered exploited, i.e. members of N ted.
The ERB must have two properties. First, it must be (just) affordable, at
prices p, by a propertyless worker ν ∈W+, who supplies λν units of labour at
wages w (pcνe = wλν ). This embodies the idea that the amount of labour thatν ∈ W+ receives depends on her income, or more precisely, it is determined
by some reference bundle that ν can purchase. In standard approaches, the
ERB is the bundle actually chosen by the agent. LEH is weaker in that it
only requires that the ERB be potentially chosen.
Second, the ERB must be technically feasible with an efficient production
process (αcνe ∈ ∂P with bαcνe = cνe ). This embodies the intuition that the
amount of labour received by an agent is related to production conditions.
More precisely, LEH states that the ERB be technologically feasible as net
output, and its labour content is the amount of labour socially necessary to
produce it. Observe that the axiom requires that the amount of labour asso-
ciated with each ERB be uniquely determined with reference to production
conditions, but it does not specify how such amount should be chosen. There
may be in principle many (efficient) ways of producing the ERB, cνe , and thus
of determining its labour content wαcνel .26
LEH imposes extremely weak and theoretically reasonable restrictions
on the appropriate definition of exploitation, and all of the main approaches,
including Definitions 1-3 above, satisfy it.27 LEH does not provide com-
prehensive conditions for the determination of exploitation status: it only
focuses on the strict subset of agents who own no physical assets and supply
some labour in return for a wage; it is silent on the exploitation status of all
other agents; and it imposes no restrictions on the set of exploiters. More
generally, LEH does not incorporate any assumptions on individual behav-
iour or on the structure of economic interactions. Nor is it based upon any
(classical or neoclassical) equilibrium notion. It does not capture any causal
mechanisms and embodies no assumptions on the nature of individuals or of
social reality. It captures the properties of the concept of exploitation in a
26We note in passing that LEH allows the ERB to be variable and a function of (p,w).
Further, once cνe is identified, the existence of αcνe is guaranteed by assumptions A0 and
A2 in Appendix A.1.
27For a proof of this claim, see the Addendum. It can also be proved that the defi-
nition of exploitation proposed in Flaschel [6, 7] - suitably extended to economies with
heterogeneous labour - also satisfies LEH.
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purely a posteriori - rather than predictionist - perspective, by focusing on
the data emerging from economic processes at a given point in time.
Because LEH is a domain condition that captures some aspects of Marx-
ian exploitation theory shared by all of the main approaches, further restric-
tions must be imposed in order to discriminate among alternative definitions.
A key tenet of Marxian theory is the idea that in capitalist economies profits
are closely related to the existence of exploitation. Given private ownership
of productive assets, profits should be a counterpart of the transfer of social
surplus and social labour from asset-poor agents to wealthy ones, and a gen-
eral correspondence should exist between positive profits and the exploitation
of at least the poorest segments of the working class. This is formalised in
the next axiom.
Profit-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (PECP): Given any
ES such that W+ 6= ∅,£
pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0 if and only if N ted ⊇W+¤ .
In other words, at any ES, aggregate profits are strictly positive if and
only if propertyless workers are exploited. This incorporates a key intuition
of Marxian exploitation theory at the centre of the debates on the FMT. Yet,
PECP is both conceptually and formally distinct from the FMT.
Conceptually, the FMT is conceived of as a causal statement: it is meant
to prove that profits emerge from (are caused by) the exploitation of workers.
Thus in the standard literature it is a result that may or may not hold in
certain economies under a given definition of exploitation. PECP is instead
conceived of as a fundamental, definitional property of Marxian exploitation
theory. It is a statement about what exploitation is, or what intuitions it
incorporates, and so it is formulated without specifying any definition: the
appropriate definition should be such that propertyless workers are exploited
if and only if profits are positive.
Formally, unlike the FMT, PECP establishes a connection between the
existence of aggregate profits and the exploitation status of a subset of the
set of agents, namely those who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’,
rather than the aggregate rate of exploitation. Thus, PECP allows for the
possibility that propertyless workers are a strict subset of the set of exploited
agents N ted, and when profits are zero it does not require that there be no
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exploitation in the economy, but only that some propertyless agents are
not exploited. Moreover, like LEH, PECP focuses only on propertyless
agents who supply some wage labour and so it imposes no constraints on the
definition of exploitation whenever W+ = ∅. This restriction is theoretically
appropriate, because the exploitation status of agents who do not engage in
any economic activities is unclear.
PECP establishes a rather weak link between exploitation and profits.28
It is therefore surprising that, in conjunction with LEH, it characterises a
family of definitions of exploitation.29
Theorem 1: For any definition of exploitation satisfying LEH, the following
two statements are equivalent at any ES:
(1) PECP holds under this definition;
(2) if πmax > 0, then for all ν ∈ W+ with wαcνel > 0, there is ανπ ∈ ∂P such
that bανπ ∈ Rn+ , pbανπ > wανπl = wλν and (ανπl,ανπ,ανπ) = ην ³αcνel ,αcνe ,αcνe´ for
some ην > 1.
Theorem 1 is mainly a technical result: it provides a condition that can
be used to check whether a given definition satisfies PECP. As such, it does
not identify a unique definition of exploitation that meets PECP, but rather
a class of definitions satisfying condition (2). Yet it has relevant implications
for the main received approaches. For there are economies in which condition
(2) never holds, if Definitions 1 and 2 are adopted. In contrast, Definition 3
satisfies condition (2), and thus the PECP, in general.30
Corollary 1: There exist ES’s such that neither Definition 1 nor Definition
2 satisfies PECP. Instead, Definition 3 satisfies PECP at any ES.
5 Conclusions
This paper explores a novel axiomatic approach to Marxian exploitation the-
ory. Two properties - a domain axiom and the Profit-Exploitation Corre-
spondence Principle - are analysed, which incorporate some widely shared
intuitions concerning the normative and positive foundations of the concept
28Oberve also that PECP is silent on the set of exploiters.
29The proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 below are in Appendix A.2.
30It can also be proved that if a definition of exploitation satisfies LEH and PECP,
then no agent in W+ is exploited whenever profits are zero.
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of exploitation. Contrary to the received view, a nonempty class of defi-
nitions of exploitation is characterised, which preserve the relation between
profits and the exploitation of propertyless workers in general economies with
a complex class structure, heterogeneous agents, complex technologies with
heterogeneous labour inputs, general market structures, and so on. Interest-
ingly, however, among the main approaches, only the ‘New Interpretation’ is
shown to satisfy PECP in general. Given the theoretical relevance of PECP
in Marxian theory, this provides strong support for Definition 3 above.
To be sure, the relation between exploitation and profits is only one -
albeit important - aspect of Marxian theory and the results in this paper do
not exhaust the analysis of the concept of exploitation. Yet, they do show
the potential of the axiomatic method and in closing the paper we briefly
mention some lines for further research.
First of all, the concept of exploitation is meant to be a diagnostic of the
characteristics of the social structure, both in its power dimension and in its
inequality dimension. In this paper, we have focused on the latter. It would
be important to extend our analysis to incorporate power, and coercive social
relations into the axiomatic framework.
Further, Theorem 1 does not identify a single definition that meetsPECP,
but rather a class of definitions. It would be interesting to analyse whether
a unique definition can be characterised by imposing further properties, and
if so, whether such definition is indeed the ‘New Interpretation’.
This is an open question, but two points are worth making that suggest
that the key insights of the paper are indeed robust. First, in the standard
Okishio-Morishima approach, the existence of exploitation is just a numerical
representation of the existence of surplus products. Thus, the FMT estab-
lishes the equivalence between positive profits and the productiveness of the
economy measured in terms of the labour numéraire. Yet, Bowles and Gintis
[2] and Roemer [31] have proved that a similar result holds when produc-
tiveness is measured in terms of any other good, thus raising doubts on the
significance of the relation between exploitation and profits. Yoshihara and
Veneziani [47] have proved that this is not true if the ‘New Interpretation’
is adopted: no equivalence between profits and exploitation holds if another
commodity is used to define exploitation.
Second, in Marxian theory, the social positions identified by the notion
of exploitation are internally related : ‘they are what they are ... by virtue of
the relation to other in which they stand’ (Lawson [16], p. 17). The existence
of an exploiter is inextricably linked to the existence of exploited agents and
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‘you cannot have the one without the other’ (ibid.). Perhaps surprisingly,
Yoshihara and Veneziani [45] have proved that the ‘New Interpretation’ is
the only conceivable definition that possesses this relational property.
In summary, this paper provides a general theoretical framework to analyse
the notion of exploitation. The results derived shed light on some important
(and vexed) issues. More importantly, they show that it is fruitful to take the
axiomatic road to exploitation theory, even though there are still a million
miles to go.
A Formal analysis
A.1 Assumption on technology
The following assumptions on P hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 0 (A0). P is a closed convex cone in R2n+T and 0 ∈ P .
Assumption 1 (A1). For all α ∈ P , if α ≥ 0 then αl ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 (A2). For all c ∈ Rn+ , there is a α ∈ P such that bα = c.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider any ES. If W+ = ∅, the equivalence is
immediately established, for both PECP and condition (2) are vacuously
satisfied. Therefore, in the rest of the proof, suppose that W+ 6= ∅.
(2)⇒(1): Suppose that if πmax > 0, then for each ν ∈W+ with wαcνel > 0,





for some ην > 1.
Let pbαp,w − wαp,wl = 0. Then by the definition of ES, πmax = 0 and
condition (2) is vacuously satisfied. By LEH, for each ν ∈ W+, cνe ∈ Rn+,
pcνe = wλν > 0 and αcνe ∈ ∂P with bαcνe = cνe . Therefore, noting that
pbαcνe = pcνe = wλν > 0, πmax = 0 implies that wαcνel = wλν . Hence, by LEH,ν /∈ N ted holds for all ν ∈W+.
Let pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0 so that πmax > 0. Consider any ν ∈ W+. If
wαcνel = 0, then by definition wαc
ν
e
l < wλν . If wαc
ν
e
l > 0, then by condition
(2), ανπ ∈ ∂P with wανπl = wλν > 0 and ην > 1 together imply wαcνel < wλν.
Thus, by LEH, ν ∈ N ted holds for any ν ∈W+.
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In summary, (2) implies that PECP holds under any definition of ex-
ploitation satisfying LEH.
(1)⇒(2): Suppose that pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0 ⇔ N ted ⊇W+.
Suppose that πmax > 0. By the definition of ES, pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0
holds, and by LEH and PECP, for each ν ∈ W+, there exist cνe ∈ Rn+
and αcνe ∈ ∂P with bαcνe = cνe and bαcνe ≯ cνe such that pcνe = wλν > 0
and wαcνel < wλν . Consider ν ∈ W+ such that wαc
ν
e
l > 0. Then let ην ∈
R+ be such that ηνwαcνel = wλν and let ανπ ≡ ηναcνe . Since αcνe ∈ ∂P
with bαcνe = cνe = 0, then bανπ ∈ Rn+ and, by A0, ανπ ∈ ∂P . Moreover, by




for some ην > 1. Finally,
pbανπ = ηνpbαcνe > pbαcνe = pcνe = wλν = wανπl holds.
In summary, if PECP holds, then (2) holds under any definition of ex-
ploitation satisfying LEH.
Proof of Corollary 1: For a proof that Definitions 1 and 2 do not satisfy
PECP, see Veneziani and Yoshihara [41], which proves the result in a subset
of the economic environments considered here.
We prove that Definition 3 satisfies condition (2) of Theorem 1. Consider
any ES with W+ 6= ∅.
Suppose πmax > 0. By the definition ofES, this implies pbαp,w−wαp,wl > 0;
and since wλν > 0 for all ν ∈ W+ then wαp,wl =
P
ν∈W+ wλν > 0. Then, for
all ν ∈W+, let ανπ = wλνwαp,wl αp,w: αp,w ∈ ∂P holds by condition (iii) of ES and
so by A0, ανπ ∈ ∂P . Moreover bανπ = wλνwαp,wl bαp,w, and so bανπ ∈ Rn+, and since
pbαp,w − wαp,wl > 0, it follows that pbανπ > wανπl = wλν .
Finally, under Definition 3, αcνe = τ cναp,w holds, where τ cν = pcν
pαp,w for








l ,αp.w,αp,w) = ην pcνpαp,w (αp,wl ,αp.w,αp,w) for some ην > 1, and
the latter inequality holds for all ν ∈W+ whenever pbαp,w −wαp,wl > 0, since
pcν = wλν for all ν ∈W+ by condition (iv) of ES.
In summary, condition (2) of Theorem 1 holds at any ES.
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1 Proof that Definitions 1, 2 and 3 satisfy LEH
For Definition 1, for all ν ∈W+, cνe ≡ cν and αcνe ∈ argmin {wαl | α ∈ P & bα = cνe}, so that
wαcνel = l.v. (cνe ;w).
For Definition 2, for all ν ∈ W+, cνe ≡ cν and αcνe ∈ argmin{wαl | α ∈ P π(p, w) &bα = cνe}, so that wαcνel = l.v. (cνe ; p, w).
For Definition 3, for all ν ∈ W+, let τ cν = pcνpαp,w , if pbαp,w > 0 and τ cν = 0, otherwise.
Then, cνe ≡ τ cν bαp,w and αcνe ≡ τ cναp,w, so that wαcνel = τ cνwαp,wl .
2 An example of an economic state
Consider an economic environment as described in the paper. In the economy, agents pro-
duce, consume, and trade labour. On the production side, they can either sell their labour-
power, or hire others to work on their capital, or they can be self-employed and work on their
own assets. Then, αν = (−ανl ,−αν ,αν ) ∈ P is the production process operated by ν as a




∈ P is the production
process that ν operates by hiring labour βνl ; γν is ν’s vector of labour supply. Thus, letλντ = αντ l + γντ be the total amount of labour time of each type τ ∈ T ν of labour expended
by ν.
Agent ν’s choices can be represented by a function uν : C → R+ , which is strictly
increasing in consumption commodities and weakly decreasing in each type of labour. For
the sake of simplicity, and with no loss of generality, the consumption space is assumed to
be sufficiently large for consumption goods.
Given (p, w), each agent ν is assumed to choose a plan (αν ,βν , γν , cν ) to maximise her
welfare subject to the constraint that (1) net income is sufficient for consumption plans; (2)
wealth is sufficient to purchase the inputs necessary for production plans; (3) production
plans are technically feasible; and (4) the consumption and labour vector are in the feasible
set. Formally, each agent ν solves:
MP ν : max
(αν ,βν ,γν ,cν )u
ν (cν ,λν)
subject to








+ [wγν ] = pcν , (1)
p
¡αν + βν¢ 5 pων , (2)
αν ,βν ∈ P , (3)
(cν ,λν) ∈ C. (4)
Let E
­
P,N , T , C, (uν)ν∈N , (T ν)ν∈N , (ων)ν∈N
®
, or as a shorthand notationE, denote the
economy with technology P , agents N , types of heterogeneous labour T , consumption space
C, utility functions (uν)ν∈N , labour endowments (T ν)ν∈N , and commodity endowments
(ων)ν∈N . Let the set of all such economies be denoted by E . Note that this is a subset of
the set of economic environments analysed in the paper.
Following Roemer (1982), the equilibrium concept can be defined.
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E ∈ E is a price vector (p,w) and an
associated profile of actions (αν ,βν , γν , cν )ν∈N such that:
1













ν∈N γν (labour market equilibrium).
In other words, at a reproducible solution (i) every agent optimises; (iii) there are enough
resources for production plans in aggregate; and (iv) the labour market clears. Condi-
tion (ii) states that aggregate net outputs should at least suffice for aggregate consump-
tion. This is a reproducibility condition because it is equivalent to requiring that the
vector of social endowments does not decrease component-wise. For (ii) is equivalent toP
ν∈N
h
ων − ¡αν + βν¢+ ³αν + βν − cν´i = Pν∈N ων , which states that aggregate stocks
at the beginning of next period should not be smaller than aggregate stocks at the beginning
of the current period.
By the assumptions on uν, it immediately follows that all prices must be strictly positive
and wages must be nonnegative, at any non-trivial reproducible solution - i.e. at any equilib-
rium where some production process is activated. The existence of a RS in such economies
can be shown as in the standard proofs of competitive equilibrium developed in the general
equilibrium theory.
Recall that πmax = maxα∈P pα−wαlpα and P π(p,w) =
n




straightforward to prove that any RS where at least some production process is activated
has the following properties.
Lemma 1: Let (p, w) be a RS for E ∈ E such that Pν∈N cν ≥ 0. Then, (i) pbαp,w−wαp,wl = 0
for some αp,w ∈ P\ {0} with bαp,w ≥Pν∈N cν and αp,wl =Pν∈N λν , (ii) αν + βν ∈ P π(p,w)
for all ν ∈ N with pων > 0, and (iii) pcν = πmaxp ¡αν + βν¢+ wλν for all ν ∈ N .
Therefore, any economy E ∈ E and any associated RS represent an economic state as defined
in the paper.
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